This paper is an introductory survey of work on the economic theory of trade union behaviour. It concentrates on recent contributions to the literature, sets out a number of central results and ideas, and speculates on future topics for research.
tional and testable theory of the trade union. George Johnson obviously felt that this was not true in 197.5: "it is worth noting that the problem of modelling trade union behaviour has proved to be virtually intractable. This is because (1) there is no consensus on the goals of union activity (see W. N. Atherton) such as exists with respect to the firm or consumer and (2) the received pure theory of bargaining is devoid of operational content. The absence of a solid theoretical foundation has handicapped the economic analysis of trade unions and has surely contributed to its decline in relative attention." Pencavel (1977) draws a similar conclusion.
Many reputable textbooks, notably Ehrenberg & Smith (1982), treat the microeconomic theory of the union in a rather simple way. 2 The existence of a trade union is thought of as shifting the competitive labour supply curve to the left, which raises the equilibrium wage and reduces employment. This is obviously ad hoc. From standard producer theory, moreover, we know that a monopolist does not have a supply curve, which might make us concerned about the use of a union's 'supply curve' in labour economics. Much of the new work on the economic theory of trade unions attempts to provide a more rigorous analysis.
The paper is divided into a number of sections. The next three concentrate on the microeconomic theory of union behaviour (the results of econometric testing, although important, are not covered 3 ) and summarize some orthodox ideas and predictions. It seems fair to conclude that this area is the best developed within the field, which is one reason to devote to it the largest part of a survey paper. Section V is less conventional; it questions the central idea in the microeconomics of unions, namely that there is a dichotomy between monopoly equilibria and efficient bargains, by constructing models in which efficient outcomes lie on the labour demand curve. One way in which this can be done is to assume that lay-offs are by seniority rather than by random draw. Section VI covers general equilibrium models. There has been surprisingly little written on these issues, and the section necessarily reflects that. The concluding segment, Section VII, contains some personal judgements about past research and one or two suggestions for future work.
D. The Microeconomics of the Thade Union: Union Preferences
Application of the usual methodology of economics to the study of unions requires that both preferences and constraints be specified. The concept of
